Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy
Volume 1
Issue 1 Medicare After the Medicare
Modernization Act

Article 6

2007

The Impact of the Medicare Modernization Act’s Contractor
Reform on Fee-for-Service Medicare
Susan Bartlett Foote
University of Minnesota School of Public Health, Foote003@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan B. Foote, The Impact of the Medicare Modernization Act’s Contractor Reform on Fee-for-Service
Medicare, 1 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol'y (2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol1/iss1/6

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE IMPACT OF THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT’S
CONTRACTOR REFORM ON FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE
SUSAN BARTLETT FOOTE*
The contentious and partisan debate surrounding the Medicare
Modernization Act (MMA)1 and the subsequent political, media, and public
discussion focused on the high profile provisions relating to prescription
drug coverage and the new Medicare Advantage plans.2 However, the
legislation also contained little-noticed and relatively non-controversial
provisions to reform the role of Medicare contractors.3 These reforms and
their subsequent implementation by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) affect fee-for-service (FFS), or “traditional,” Medicare
through which a majority of Medicare beneficiaries receive their medical
services.4
This article (1) discusses the roots of the original Medicare contractor
structure and traces its evolution from 1965 until the passage of the MMA;
(2) examines the MMA contractor reform legislation and its implementation
to date; and (3) analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the reform and its
implications for the future of FFS Medicare.

* J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., American & Latin
American History, Case Western Reserve University; Professor, Division of Health Policy and
Management, University of Minnesota School of Public Health.
1. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Partisan Arguing and Fine Print Seen as
Hindering Medicare Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/
2004/10/11/politics/11medicare.html?ex=1255233600&en=87d60bcfe109b4b3&ei=508
8&partner=rssnyt (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
3. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act §§ 911-912, 117
Stat. at 2378-88.
4. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (Sept.
2005), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Medicare-Advantage-April-2005-FactSheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (noting that 88% of Medicare beneficiaries have their
health bills paid by the traditional FFS program); cf. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N,
REPORT TO CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM 60 (2005) (discussing
membership trends in Medicare private plans declining from 17% in 1999 to 12% in 2004).
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I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF CONTRACTORS FROM 1965-2003
The political debates leading up to the passage of the Medicare Act in
1965 were bitter and protracted.5 A major barrier to passing the legislation
was the hospitals and organized medicine’s opposition to perceived
governmental interference with their unfettered freedom to practice
medicine.6 In order to secure these key constituencies’ support, Congress
designed the Medicare program to allow private insurers to contract with the
government.7 These contractors would process providers’ claims for
payment, essentially serving as a “‘buffer between the hospital and the
federal government.’”8
The 1965 Medicare statute defined two different contracting structures
to correspond to the separation of Part A (hospital services) and Part B
(physician services). Section 1816 of the Social Security Act authorized the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare9 to establish agreements with
fiscal intermediaries (FIs) nominated by individual hospitals to make
Medicare payments to these providers.10 Section 1842 authorized the
Secretary to enter into contracts with health insurers (referred to as carriers)
to make Medicare payments to physicians, practitioners, and other
healthcare entities.11 The Part B contracts were organized by geographic
regions; one carrier had exclusive jurisdiction within the contract’s region,
thus all Part B claims in that region were submitted to that carrier.12
The statute specifically set out certain terms and conditions of the
contracting agreements for FIs and carriers, including how the contracts
were to be awarded and terminated, cost-based reimbursement provisions
for contractor services, the required claims processing and related activities,

5. See generally JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE (1977) (discussing the influence politics and the political administration had on
making the Social Security Administration responsible for Medicare); THEODORE R. MARMOR,
THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973) (discussing the various players and kinds of legislative
activity involved in Congress enacting controversial legislation such as Medicare); PAUL STARR,
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
6. See FEDER, supra note 5, at 37-38.
7. See id. at 37.
8. Id. (quoting a former Social Security Administration official’s explanation of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary’s testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee in 1965).
9. In 1980, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare became the Department
of Health and Human Services. See History of HHS, www.hhs.gov/faq/about/department/
1894.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
10. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102, § 1816, 79
Stat. 286, 297 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395h).
11. See id. sec. 102, § 1842, 79 Stat. at 309-10.
12. See ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE 181-82 (1970).
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as well as performance standards for contractors.13 The statutory specificity
reflected the need to reassure the providers how the government planned to
use private insurers to manage the interface with hospitals and doctors.14

A. Implementation and Evolution of Contractors
After the Medicare Act was passed, the program’s administrators
implemented the new contracting process for FIs and carriers.15 The
American Hospital Association, then affiliated with Blue Cross, selected the
national Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) as the prime
contractor for all member hospitals. BCBSA, in turn, subcontracted with
local Blues plans to perform the services.16 Most hospitals selected Blue
Cross as their FI; however, a few hospitals selected one of the five other
national insurance companies or an independent hospital association as
Others chose to deal directly with the Social Security
their FI.17
Administration.18
To implement the Part B contracting plan, the administration divided the
country into sixty-four regions.19 Only 49 of the 140 organizations,
including Blue Shield plans and commercial insurers, that submitted
proposals to be carriers received contracts.20 Many of the geographic
regions for a single carrier contract were whole states. However, some
large states or states where there were multiple applicants were carved into
several jurisdictions.21
Although the statute contained some specific provisions that remained
constant from 1965 to 2000, the Medicare program evolved over time
within the original statutory framework. In the 1960s, the contractor
structure depended on the existing private insurance system.22 As private
insurers changed, so did Medicare contractors. The number of contractors

13. See sec. 102, § 1842, 79 Stat. at 309-10.
14. See MYERS, supra note 12, at 179-80 (discussing how “fiscal intermediaries” was
narrowly defined regarding power and responsibility).
15. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Focus on Locus: Evolution of Medicare’s Local Coverage
Policy, 22 HEALTH AFF. 137, 137-145 (2003) (discussing the legislative history and
administrative implementation of Medicare’s local coverage policy).
16. ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 147 (1997).
17. See MYERS, supra note 12, at 179.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 181.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 181-182 (discussing the regional design of the carriers).
22. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE CONTRACTORS: DESPITE ITS EFFORTS, HCFA
CANNOT ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS OR INTEGRITY 43 (1999), available at www.gao.gov/
archive/1999/he99115.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
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has been reduced considerably over time. The General Accounting Office23
(GAO) reported that there were 75 FIs and 43 carriers in 1980. The
numbers dropped to 36 FIs and 22 carriers in 1999 and then to 25 FIs and
18 carriers in 2005.24 These changes largely reflect consolidations in the
private insurance industry, especially among local and regional Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans.25 In addition, some plans left the business to
concentrate on their “core insurance market functions,” while others were
accused of fraud and abuse, faced criminal and civil settlements, and
withdrew from the program.26 Successful contractors took advantage of
departures to acquire additional carrier and FI contracts to build multicontract networks.27 The growth of multi-state networks led to significant
variations in the size, sophistication, resources, and productivity of
contracting services.28
Over time the responsibilities of the remaining contractors expanded as
did the regulatory framework in which contractors operated. Originally,
contractors focused on processing claims for payment, serving essentially as
a bill paying service.29 However, as the Medicare program grew and
became more complex, the contractors took on greater responsibilities for
medical provider education, local coverage policy development, and other
public communication.30
The original statutory provisions surrendered major management control
of the Medicare program to the contractors.31 However, as costs exploded
and complexities grew, the administration exercised greater control over
contractors, as evidenced by increasing procedural requirements and

23. In 2004, the General Accounting Office’s name changed to the Government
Accountability Office. U.S. GAO, GAO's Name Change and Other Provisions of the GAO
Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, http://gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2007).
24. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 45 fig.3.1; MICHAEL O. LEAVITT,
REPORT TO CONGRESS – MEDICARE CONTRACTING REFORM: A BLUEPRINT FOR A BETTER MEDICARE
I-2 (2005), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareContractingReform/Downloads/report_
to_congress.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
25. See Foote, supra note 15, at 140.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 141.
28. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote et al., Resolving the Tug-of-War Between
Medicare’s National and Local Coverage, 23 HEALTH AFF. 108 (2004) (discussing the
evolution of multi-state networks and analyzing variation among Medicare contractors).
29. See Susan Bartlett Foote & Gwen Wagstrom Halaas, Defining a Future for Fee-forService Medicare, 25 HEALTH AFF. 864, 865 (2006).
30. See id. at 865 (discussing current responsibilities of local contractors).
31. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102, §§ 1816,
1842, 79 Stat. 286, 297, 309-10 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395u).
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performance oversight.32 GAO reports strongly criticized the contractors’
performance.33 Continual tension between federal regulators and the
contractors existed over management and oversight responsibilities.34

B.

Early Efforts for Contractor Reform

For over twenty-five years, periodic efforts have been made to amend
the statutory contracting rules. As early as 1980, the deputy administrator
of the Health Care Financing Administration testified that the program
“‘do[es] not contain sufficient incentives for efficient, innovative . . .
operations.’”35 Since 1993, proposals have been made to amend the
legislation to increase competition for contracts and to provide more
flexibility in the contract relationships.36 During the 107th Congress, the
Health Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee again
focused on the issue.
In a rare demonstration of bi-partisanship,
Subcommittee Chairman Nancy Johnson (R-CT) and Ranking Member
Fortney (Pete) Stark (D-CA) introduced the “Medicare Regulatory

32. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the agency preceding CMS,
issued manuals for the FIs and carriers that contain regulations, guidance documents, and
other directives that the contractors must follow. CMS frequently revises the Manuals to reflect
changing administrative policies and procedures. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., CMS MANUAL SYSTEM PUB 100-104: MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING (May 2, 2005)
(discussing changes made to Medicare Claims Processing Manual regarding FI claim
adjudication), available at www3.cms.hhs.gov/Transmittals/downloads/R555CP.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2007).
33. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 20-42 (explaining
how weak oversight of contractors makes Medicare vulnerable since several contractors have
misrepresented their performance to HCFA and been involved in qui tam actions and other
Department of Justice investigations).
34. See STARR, supra note 5, at 379-80 (explaining that until the 1970s, the health system
had the authority to run its own affairs; however, during the 1970s as costs rose, tensions
grew between the medical care system’s expansion and a state and society that were
requiring control over medical expenditures and the health system).
35. Patients First– A 21st Century Promise to Ensure Quality and Affordable Health

Coverage: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) [hereinafter
Joint Hearing] (statement of Thomas A. Scully, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/action/
107-52.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (quoting a 1980 statement by former Deputy
Administrator of HCFA, Earl Collier).
36. See The Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R.
2768 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. On Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 43
(2001) (statement of Leslie G. Aronovitz, Director, Healthcare Program, Administration and
Integrity Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings&docid=f:76025.pdf (last visited Nov.
10, 2007).
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Contracting Reform Act of 2001” (H.R. 2768) on August 2, 2001.37 The
Ways and Means Committee favorably reported the bill on October 4,
2001.38 After review by the Energy and Commerce Committee, a revised
version of the bill (H.R. 3391) passed the House on a 408-0 vote on
December 4, 2001.39
Similar to prior reform efforts, the key purpose of the House bill was to
provide Medicare with management tools to operate more efficiently.40
These tools included competitive contracting rules, consolidating Part A and
Part B contractors, and allowing contracts for specific services such as
The Bush administration strongly
claims processing or education.41
42
During the debate in 2001, then CMS
supported these efforts.
Administrator Tom Scully specifically criticized the large number of
contractors and the inconsistencies in the way they processed claims.43 He
stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), Tommy
Thompson, specifically directed him to “fix” the contractor system.44 The
Senate took no action on the issue, and the bill died.45 However, the
Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act that passed the House in
2002 incorporated most of the House bill’s provisions.46
II. THE MMA INCORPORATES CONTRACTOR REFORM

A. The MMA Provisions
During the 108th Congress, Chairman Johnson and Representative
Stark reintroduced Medicare contractor reform in a freestanding bill.47
Entitled the “Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2003,”
H.R. 810 was nearly identical to H.R. 3391 that had passed in the House in

37. H.R. REP. NO. 108-74, pt. 1, at 39 (2003).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-288, pt. 1, at 22 (2001) (noting that a purpose of H.R. 2768
was to streamline the regulatory process).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 22-23.
43. See Foote, supra note 15, at 143.
44. See Joint Hearing, supra note 35 (explaining that Secretary Thompson continually
asked Administrator Scully to “fix” the way the Medicare contracting system works).
45. See U.S. House Comm. on Ways & Means, Status of Bills & Resolutions Within the
Jurisdiction of the Comm. on Ways & Means on Which Legislative Action Was Taken, 107th
Congress, at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/graphics/status107.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2007) (showing Senate took no action on H.R. 3391).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 108-74, pt. 1, at 39-40 (2003).
47. H.R. REP. NO. 108-74, pt. 1, at 40 (2003).
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the previous session.48 The Senate was much less involved with the
contractor reform part of the MMA.49 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
introduced S. 133250 as a companion bill to H.R. 810, but the Senate took
no action. However, the final version of the MMA did incorporate the
contractor reform language developed in the House bill.51
The contractor reform provisions aim to improve what legislators termed
“an antiquated, inefficient, and closed system” that “has failed to keep pace
with integrated delivery in the private sector.”52 Section 1874A directs the
Secretary to merge the Part A FIs and Part B carriers into new Medicare
Administrative Contractors (MACs).53 The legislation also permits greater
contracting flexibility by allowing a wider range of entities to participate in
the program and allowing separate “functional” contracts.54 The Secretary
is given the authority to take performance quality, price, and other factors
into account in a competitive bidding process to award MAC contracts and
can renew these contracts for up to five years.55 The legislation requires the
Secretary to provide reports detailing the agency’s plan for implementing
these provisions.56

B.

Implementation Begins: The Leavitt Report

In February of 2005, HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt gave Congress the
department’s required report recounting the progress in implementing the
contracting provisions.57 Secretary Leavitt’s report recites Congress’ reform
objectives and notes that the main goal of contractor reform is to streamline

48. Id. at 39.
49. See U.S. House Comm. on Ways & Means, Status of Bills and Resolutions Within the
Jurisdiction of the Comm. on Ways & Means On Which Legislative Action Was Taken, 108th
Congress, at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/graphics/status108.htm (last visited
Oct. 16, 2007) (showing Senate took no action on H.R. 810).
50. Medicare Education, Regulatory Reform, and Contracting Improvement Act of 2003,
S. 1332, 108th Cong. (2003).
51. Compare Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173 §§ 911-912, 117 Stat. 2066, 2378-88 with H.R. 810, 108th Cong.
(2003).
52. H.R. REP. NO. 107-288, pt. 1, at 23 (2001).
53. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1395kk-1).
54. See id. at sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A(a) (giving the Secretary authority to contract with
“any eligible entity” and allowing an entity to enter into a contract to perform a particular
function).
55. Id. at sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2379-81.
56. Id. at sec. 911(a)(1), § 1874A, 117 Stat. 2066, 2386.
57. LEAVITT, supra note 24.
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Medicare’s FFS operations.58 HHS began with reducing the number of
contractors by merging Part A and Part B contractors.59 Accordingly, HHS
also reduced the number of regions by redrawing the lines to correspond to
the new MACs.60 HHS planned to “award 15 Primary A/B MACs servicing
the majority of all types of providers, 4 specialty MACs servicing . . . home
health and hospice (HH) providers, and 4 specialty MACs servicing durable
medical equipment (DME) suppliers.”61 Although some variation exists
among the fifteen regions, they were carved out to balance the number of
FFS beneficiaries and Medicare providers in each region and create a more
equalized distribution of workload than was present under the FI and carrier
assignment system.62 The goals for the new MAC contractors in these
regions are to integrate claims processing activities, improve customer
service and operations, reduce claims processing error rates, and implement
new information technology to modernize and update antiquated financial
management and fragmented accounting systems.63
Secretary Leavitt’s report describes the new MAC selection schedule.
Between 2005 and 2009, CMS will choose the MACs from the pool of
competing contractors.64 The first new A/B MAC and four DME MACs were
awarded in 2006,65 and the full FFS workload transition will be completed
by October 2009.66
III. ANALYSIS
CMS administrators and their predecessors sought the contractor reform
provisions in the MMA for many years.67 Should these provisions be
considered a victory for FFS Medicare? Will these modifications to the
original contractor legislation ensure that Medicare FFS is, as Secretary

58. See id. at i.
59. See id. at III-2.
60. Id. at III-2, III-3.
61. Id.
62. See LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3.
63. See id. at Chapter III.
64. See id. at III-3. The process of replacing old contracts is still underway as of this
writing.
65. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTOR (MAC)
JURISDICTIONS FACT SHEET 4 (Sept. 2007), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/Medicare
ContractingReform/Downloads/MAC_Jurisdiction_Facts.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
66. LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3.
67. See Joint Hearing, supra note 35 (quoting then HCFA Deputy Administrator’s speech
in the 1980s which called for contracting reform).
67. LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3.
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Leavitt has stated, “a premier health plan that allows for comprehensive,
quality care and world-class beneficiary and provider service”?68
Analyzing the legislative design and its implementation reveals that while
many of the efficiency goals may succeed, barriers exist to the realization of
Secretary Leavitt’s assertion. These barriers include the limited scope of the
legislation and the manner in which it is being implemented. Both reflect
the influence of the ideology held by the Republicans in Congress and the
administration when the MMA was enacted.
The legislative provisions already emphasize efficiency in claims
processing,69 and many of the changes the Secretary envisioned are
important to achieving efficiency.
Who can argue with upgraded
information systems, less fragmentation, and improved service incentives?
However, the Medicare FFS infrastructure must go beyond efficiency in order
to meet the needs of the twenty-first century Medicare program. Improving
FFS Medicare demands more than speedy claims processing; it requires a
comprehensive redesign of the role of Medicare contractors. New tools are
also needed if Medicare is to ensure quality of care for beneficiaries. In
order to evaluate provider performance and outcomes, contractors need an
infrastructure to acquire and analyze data that goes beyond the current
claim forms.70 They also need tools to encourage and enforce appropriate
utilization of services and performance.71 Contractors need to be rewarded
for raising quality and not just for achieving efficiency in claims processing.72
It is quite challenging to conceptualize how to create quality management
within an essentially unmanaged FFS program. However, creative efforts to
design those tools, through either redesign of the contractor roles or other
mechanisms, must be undertaken.73
There are also barriers to a robust FFS future embedded in the
implementation of the MAC regions. Prior to the MMA, the carrier and FI
regions were drifting into incoherence.74 The original sixty-four carrier

68. Id. at i.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56 (discussing legislative methods for
increasing efficiency).
70. See LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-7 (discussing the key role data centers play in claims
processing and the need for a modernization of data center operations); see also Foote &
Halaas, supra note 29, at 867 (discussing the need to invest in FFS infrastructure).
71. See Foote & Halaas, supra note 29, at 866-67 (discussing possible quality
improvement measures that Medicare contractors could adopt).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 865-867 (discussing the current role of local contractors and offering
recommendations on contractor reform).
74. See Joint Hearing, supra note 35 (describing the existing contractor environment and
resulting patchwork of networks); Foote, supra note 15, at 141 (discussing formation of multistate and multi-contract networks).
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regions reflected the underlying insurance infrastructure at the time.75 The
conventional wisdom likely was that the regions were designed in part to
reflect the tremendous variation in the use and quality of Medicare services
across the country.76 However, the creation of multi-contract networks was
a response to contracting opportunities rather than continuing development
of coherent regions.77 The variation in the size and resources of contractors
also created corresponding differences in their efforts.78 The fifteen new
regions are similarly incoherent. CMS drew them to equalize region size
based on number of beneficiaries and providers79 rather than practice
patterns or referral patterns that would provide a basis for measuring quality
improvement.
Multiple regional designs in the MMA based on different principles
exacerbated these problems. The MACs are designed for efficiency.80
However, a completely different set of values underlies the new Medicare
Advantage Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) regions and the
freestanding prescription drug plans (PDPs) regions.81 Therefore, the
program cannot coherently incentivize regional improvements in quality
because the regional designs of the two delivery models are not coherent. It
is challenging to run a national program that has parallel delivery structures
and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) recognized that
two competing delivery models might encourage better performance from
each as they compete for beneficiaries.82 However, making rational

75. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22; MYERS, supra note 12, at 181
(discussing the formation of the original sixty-four carrier regions and how thirty-three Blue
Shield Plans covered the majority of regions).
76. For a discussion of geographic variation in Medicare spending, see John E.
Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare Reform, 2002 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCL.) W96, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.96v1.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2007).
77. See Foote, supra note 15, at 140 (discussing motivations for reducing the number of
contractors).
78. See id. at 143 (discussing variations in contractor policies).
79. See LEAVITT, supra note 24, at III-3 (discussing the rationale behind formation of the
fifteen regions).
80. See id. at I-3 (discussing how the reforms grew out of a realization that Medicare
needed to be more efficient and effective to adequately service beneficiaries and healthcare
providers).
81. See Susan Bartlett Foote & Peter J. Neumann, The Impact of Medicare Modernization
on Coverage Policy: 0Recommendations for Reform, 11 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 140, 140
(2005) (discussing formation of Medicare Advantage PPOs); Covington & Burling, CMS
Establishes PDP and MA Regions (Dec. 2004), available at www.cov.com/
listall.aspx?showpubitems=true&archiveyear=2004 (follow article’s title hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 25, 2008) (explaining the key considerations used by CMS in establishing PDP regions).
82. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 4.
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comparisons is difficult, if not impossible, as the two models operate in
different silos within the program.
The ideology underlying the MMA plays a role in these challenges. The
Republican authors of the legislation clearly favored the Medicare
Advantage health plans over the FFS part of the program,83 reflecting their
support for “privatizing” Medicare by moving the program from FFS
administered pricing to premium support for health plan choices.84 The
MMA delivers greater financial resources in support of Medicare Advantage,
including paying the plans premiums that exceed the FFS payments to
doctors and hospitals.85
IV. CONCLUSION
The contractor reform provisions in the MMA were long sought in order
to create greater flexibility and efficiency in the administration of the FFS
side of Medicare. While they do provide opportunities for necessary
improvements, they fall far short of truly “modernizing” the popular and
important FFS infrastructure. Advocates of FFS must seek reforms that will
provide the necessary tools and infrastructure to promote improvements in
quality and must ensure that FFS receives fiscal parity with the Medicare
Advantage side of the program.

83. See Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Disadvantaged and the Search for the Elusive
‘Level Playing Field,’ 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W4-572, W4-577, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.572v1.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
84. See id. at W4-576-77.
85. See id. at W4-577.
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